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Gruppe Tactics
Gruppe Defence
| Gruppenfueher | Squad Leader |
"The group leader must be an example - and a combat example - to his men. The most effective means for gaining the confidence and respect of subordinates and for getting the most out of them is to set an example. But in order to set an example, the squad leader must hve a stronger will than his men, must do more than they do, and must always discharge his duties and obey orders cheerfully... In order to be a leader in the field, a superior must display an exemplary bearing before his men in teh moment of danger and be willing, if necessary, to die for them." | |
| Troopenfueher | Troop Leader |
| Assault Group | |
| Light Machine Gun | |
| Feuerkampf | Fire Fight |
| remain well concealed unless active in the fire fight or advancing to contact never to hesitate on teh battlefield so as to become 'mere targets' mg and rifles are not searate entityes, but part and parcel of the gruppe even though the men would generally be firing at will victory likely to go to the side achieving the most concentrated rapid fire on target | |
| integration with larger plans | |
| principles of posts and scattered in depth | |
| gruppe on defence | |
| expected to dig-in on a frontage of 30 or 40 meters, the max a squad leader could effectively oversee in a defending battle. major landmarks such as single trees or crests were best shunned as too attractive to enemy fire during digging one member of the squad is to stand sentry, preventing surprise from ground or air gaps between squads might be left, although covered by fire key to defence was location of MG, and would be given several alternate positions, maybe 50 or more meters apart, that were identified from the outset. it would cover longer range targets, whiel riflement, who may be held further back, were concerned mainly with sweeping the terrain at close and very close range | |
| position | |
| men in pairs in foxholes, trenches, ditches, etc, posted close enough to comunicate with their partner. These liggle sub-section nests would be slighly separated, echeloned, or at different levels, thus decreasing the effect of enemy fire. good camouflage is complemented by the avoidance of any obvious movment ot attract enemy observation | |
| defensive fire fight | |
| started
by MG at effective range, riflemen remain concealed until enemy
assault, at wich point they all open fire regardless of cover. grenades falling on teh position were to be dealt with eithe rby the men diving away into cover, or by picking it up and throwing it back. against tanks, it is to be put on a tank proof obsticle and equiped with at least one AT weapon, all round defence, and arty support by a forward observer. active protrols with AT weapon as small as a single squad encouraged to intercept enemy tanks probing a defence. | |
| Vorposten | Outposts |
| squad
is given an outpost beyond the main line. details were given advance
orders as to what do in specific eventuatlies, such as when to fall
back to the main line. Made more secure by a pre-planned arty strike,
numerous dummy positions to distract attention, and identified safe
routes away from the front. | |
| elasttic defence experience on the western front during wwi had a strong influence on defenceive doctrine. The development of the elastic defence (elastische Kampfverfahren, litteraly elastic battle procedures). By 1916 it was realized a solide mutli layed trench system with an unyielding defence aimed at holding every meter of ground was impractical. The position was rebuilt into three zones, a combat outpost zone with minimal lookouts and defence against patrols. The 1500-3000 meter deep main battle zone with trenches concentrated on key terrain, rather than rigid lines covering all areas, this zone was intended to halt an attack. The third zone is the rear zone with artillery and reservers. After fighting its way through the outpost zone, then into the battle zone, the attacker would often exhaust themselves after counter attacks and artillery fire. Instead of attempting to stop the attack outright, some penetration into the battle zone was accepted. Implemented in 1917 and proven by wars end in 1918, this metod of defence was accepted by the post-war Reichsheer. Further development of this concept occured in the early 20's adding a fourth zone a mobile element that could be empoloyed depending upon the situation. This created a more mobile and fluid element to the defensive position. Further as the concept of mobile warfare and blitzkrieg was developing any further research on defencive and not offensive missions was at risk of being minimised, although some further changes occured adding more minefields, anti-tank guns, and armor as a counter attacking force. By winter 1941 the german army was again on the defensive. | |
| principles of unit defence Establishment of a common set of principiles for the conduct of defence employed own to the squad level. (space, distances, density, support would vary as would construction materiels, obsticla, stype of fortifications, and how they were manned and deployed depends upon the unique conditions on each front.) High ground: Alsway desirable position for its observation advantages, extended field of fire, and its harder to fight uphill. Natural terrain obsticales integrated into defence as much as possible. Routes and diretison of possible enemy attacks determined and infantry asupporting weapons designated to cover these approaches. Goal is to destroy or disrupt attacks by concentraing all availble weapons before the enemy reaches the main battle position. Commander needs to identify the main effor point (schwepunkt) in both defence and attack. The point at which he would conentrate effort and firepower. In defence with was the point where the enemy would attempt to break through. He would concentrate his defences and suporting weaoosn there. defence established in depth, but not just using four zones, each zone in itself would be organizsed in depth with the weapons providing mutual cover for each other. employment of obsticles and minefiels is critical strongpoint defence, there is not continuous defensive line. gaps to be covered between mutually supporting positions by outposts, patrols,a dn observation and long range fire. camouflage efforts and all-round security were continuous during the development of defensiv epositions. Camo must prevent enemy from detecing positions from the gorund and air. Recon forward of defensive zone is necessary to warn of enemy's approach and his activities. obsticales should also be concealed, wire placed behind along natural contour lines on low ground, reverse slopes, along edge of fields and within vegetation. Swampsl, marshes, forests, rivers, streams, gullies, ravines, broken and rockeng ground all halted slow attacks.To be effective obsticle must be covered by observation and fire. | |
| Planning Defences: Depth and Frontage: main battle line advanced position combat outposts maint battle field strongpoint concept hedgerow defences normandy 44 defensive firepower principles of camouflage Afrika defences Italy Defences Eastern Front Defences | |